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ABORTION-RELATED DISCLOSURES AND HOW THE 
MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY CAN INSTITUTE A NOVEL 
AND INNOVATIVE PREGNANCY DISCLOSURE 
MARY L. SCOTT∗ 
Nearly half of pregnancies in the United States, more than two million 
pregnancies every year, are unintended.1  In 2010, fifty-eight percent, or 
more than 70,000, of total pregnancies in Maryland were unintended.2  
When an unintended pregnancy occurs, the pregnant person3 may not un-
derstand their options regarding the pregnancy or know about the availabil-
ity of various pregnancy-related resources.  There are many stories of preg-
nant people who did not terminate or delayed terminating their pregnancy 
due to inaccurate information.  Sharon ended up at a crisis pregnancy center 
after “search[ing] the internet for ‘free pregnancy test’ and ‘free ultra-
sound.’”4  Following the ultrasound, she was told her pregnancy was too far 
along to get an abortion; however, later at an abortion clinic5 she discovered 
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 1.  GUTTMACHER INST., FACT SHEET: UNINTENDED PREGNANCY IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/factsheet/fb-unintended-pregnancy-us.pdf.  
 2.  KATHRYN KOST, GUTTMACHER INST., UNINTENDED PREGNANCY RATES AT THE STATE 
LEVEL: ESTIMATES FOR 2010 AND TRENDS SINCE 2002 8 (2015), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/stateup10.pdf. 
 3.  While the majority of people who become pregnant identify as female, I use the term 
pregnant people in this Comment to include those who do not identify as female but may still be-
come pregnant either intentionally or unintentionally.  However, pregnancy has long been consid-
ered a women’s rights issue and I ask the reader to keep the history of the oppression of women 
and the fight for women’s rights in mind. 
 4.  Brief for 51 Reproductive Rights, Civil Rights, and Social Justice Organizations as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 17–18, NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (No. 16-
1140).  
 5.  Abortion clinics differ from crisis pregnancy centers because they abortion clinics pro-
vide abortion procedures, while crisis pregnancy centers are faith-based groups that wish to dis-
courage people from seeking abortions.  Laura Bassett, What Are “Crisis Pregnancy Centers,” 
and Why Does the Supreme Court Care About Them?, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 13, 2017), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/crisis-pregancy-centers-supreme-
court_us_5a09f40ae4b0bc648a0d13a2.  There are reports that crisis pregnancy centers transmit 
biased information to those seeking assistance.  NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, THE TRUTH 
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she was within the legal timeframe to elect an abortion.6  Cherisse called a 
number on an advertisement that said, “Need abortion?  Call us.”7  After at-
tending two separate appointments, she was incorrectly informed that it was 
too late for an abortion because “the procedure would perforate her uterus, 
and she would never be able to have children” despite the fact that she was 
still in the first trimester.8  Cherisse reluctantly decided not to terminate the 
pregnancy since she wanted to be a mom someday.9 
Additionally, receiving inaccurate medical information regarding 
pregnancy can endanger the lives of pregnant people.10  Sarah went to a cri-
sis pregnancy center after taking a home pregnancy test but was told she 
was not pregnant and must have miscarried.11  In fact, it was an ectopic 
pregnancy and Sarah needed emergency surgery to remove the fertilized 
egg and the fallopian tube in which it was located, putting her life and fu-
ture fertility at risk.12  These stories and countless others illustrate how in-
accurate information regarding pregnancy can cause many unwanted and 
unnecessary consequences. 
Informed consent is required for all medical procedures,13 but this re-
quirement has been obfuscated with regard to abortion.14  While disclosure 
of the risks of a particular procedure is a routine part of informed consent, 
the United States Supreme Court’s past rulings allow a state to intermingle 
its interest in protecting human life with abortion-related informed consent 
disclosures.15  Some states jumped on this opportunity to introduce scientif-
                                                 
ABOUT CRISIS PREGNANCY CENTERS (2017), https://www.prochoiceamerica.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/6.-The-Truth-About-Crisis-Pregnancy-Centers.pdf. 
 6.  Brief for 51 Reproductive Rights, Civil Rights, and Social Justice Organizations, supra 
note 4, at 17–18. 
 7.  Id. at 19. 
 8.  Id.  Abortions are legal in most states until the point of viability, which is between twen-
ty-four to twenty-eight weeks after the pregnant person’s last menstrual period.  State Bans on 
Abortion Throughout Pregnancy, GUTTMACHER INST. (Mar. 1, 2019), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/state-policies-later-abortions.  While some states 
have pushed this standard back to twenty weeks, the first trimester still ends significantly before 
this point of viability, at twelve weeks.  Id.; Stages of Pregnancy, OFFICE ON WOMEN’S HEALTH 
(Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.womenshealth.gov/pregnancy/youre-pregnant-now-what/stages-
pregnancy.  
 9.  Brief for 51 Reproductive Rights, Civil Rights, and Social Justice Organizations, supra 
note 4, at 19–20. 
 10.  Id. at 23. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id.  An ectopic pregnancy occurs when a fertilized egg implants outside of the uterus, 
usually in a fallopian tube.  Frequently Asked Questions FAQ155 Pregnancy, AM. COLL. OF 
OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS (Feb. 2018), https://www.acog.org/-/media/For-
Patients/faq155.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20190702T0106394685. 
 13.  See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (establishing the concept 
of informed consent for medical procedures). 
 14.  See infra Section I.B.  
 15.  See infra Section I.B. 
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ically invalid information, such as abortion increases the possibility of sui-
cide16 and various cancers,17 into their informed consent requirements.18  
Additionally, some states require abortion providers to show pregnant peo-
ple a sonogram image of the fetus and describe the various aspects of the 
image or amplify the sound of the heartbeat.19  The Supreme Court declined 
opportunities to strike down these various disclosures for abortion proce-
dures.20 
However, in 2018, the Court struck down a California law, the FACT 
Act,21 requiring a notice to be posted in the waiting room of crisis pregnan-
cy centers stating that many pregnancy services, including abortion, were 
offered by the state for little or no cost.22  When the FACT Act became law 
in California, a number of crisis pregnancy center organizations, such as the 
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (“NIFLA”), protested and 
asked the United States District Court for the Southern District of California 
for a preliminary injunction.23  While the history of abortion-related disclo-
sures suggested the FACT Act would stand, the Court struck down the law 
                                                 
 16.  See, e.g.,  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii) (2011) (“A consent to an abor-
tion is not voluntary and informed, unless . . . the physician provides that pregnant [person] 
with . . . [a] description of all known medical risks of the procedure and statistically significant 
risk factors to which the pregnant [person] would be subjected, including . . . [i]ncreased risk of 
suicide ideation and suicide . . . .”). 
 17.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(a)(3) (West 2018) (“At least 24 hours before the abor-
tion the physician who is to perform the abortion or the referring physician has informed the [per-
son] in writing of . . . a description of risks related to the proposed abortion method, including . . . 
risk of breast cancer . . . .”). 
 18.  As of February 1, 2019, five states mandate counseling including information regarding a 
supposed link between breast cancer and abortion, and eight states mandate counseling including 
information regarding a supposed link between negative psychological effects and abortion.  An 
Overview of Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/overview-abortion-laws.  The American Cancer 
Society reports that there is no link between breast cancer and abortion.  Abortion and Breast 
Cancer Risk, AM. CANCER SOC’Y (June 19, 2014), https://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancer-
causes/medical-treatments/abortion-and-breast-cancer-risk.html.  Similarly, Guttmacher Institute 
reviewed several studies regarding feelings after having an abortion and found no evidence of lat-
er mental health problems.  Emotional and Mental Health After Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST., 
https://www.guttmacher.org/perspectives50/emotional-and-mental-health-after-abortion (last vis-
ited Jan. 14, 2019).  
 19.  As of February 1, 2019, three states require an abortion provider to display and describe 
an ultrasound image; nine additional states require the provider to perform the ultrasound and of-
fer the option to view the image.  Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 1, 
2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/requirements-ultrasound. 
 20.  These abortion-related disclosures began to emerge in state laws following Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, in which the Supreme Court allowed a twen-
ty-four-hour waiting period to stand as an acceptable requirement of informed consent.  505 U.S. 
833, 885 (1992).  The Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari to any of the cases discussed in 
this Comment except NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).   
 21.  2015 Cal. Stat. 5351. 
 22.  Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2375. 
 23.  Id. at 2370. 
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while other abortion-related disclosure requirements, such as the require-
ments discussed above, stand in thirty-seven states.24 
This Comment will first examine the history of abortion-related dis-
closures since the legalization of abortion in 1973.25  Specifically, it will re-
view the decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey26 and the subsequent Circuit Court split regarding whether Casey es-
tablished a test for future abortion-related disclosures.27  In particular, this 
Comment will discuss recent cases in which Baltimore, Maryland and the 
State of California attempted to reverse the paradigm and impose disclosure 
requirements on crisis pregnancy centers before the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy 
Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore,28 before the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in NIFLA v. Harris,29 and finally before the 
Supreme Court in NIFLA v. Becerra.30  This Comment will argue that due 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Becerra and in order to effectively edu-
cate the pregnant population of the state, the Maryland General Assembly 
should develop a novel Pregnancy Disclosure—the substance of which this 
Comment proposes—to inform pregnant people of all their options at the 
first possible opportunity, including available resources and both abortion 
and childbirth risks.31 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Since the legalization of abortion, constant legal challenges arise re-
garding many aspects of this right.  The Supreme Court’s allowance for 
abortion-related disclosures continues to evolve over time.  Section I.A dis-
cusses the evolution of abortion-related disclosures since abortion became 
legal in 1973.32  Additionally, Section I.B examines the current split among 
the Circuit Courts regarding which test should be applied to abortion-
related disclosures.33  Lastly, Section I.C reviews the most recent Maryland-
specific case, Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. 
Mayor of Baltimore,34 the most recent Supreme Court case regarding abor-
                                                 
 24.  Parental consent or involvement is required in thirty-seven states and a waiting period 
after counseling is required in twenty-seven states.  An Overview of Abortion Laws, supra note 18.  
 25.  See infra Section I.A. 
 26.  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 27.  See infra Section I.B. 
 28.  879 F.3d 101 (4th Cir. 2018); see infra Section I.C.1. 
 29.  839 F.3d 823 (2016), rev’d sub nom. NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); see infra 
Section I.C.2. 
 30.  138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); see infra Section I.C.3. 
 31.  See infra Section II.A–C. 
 32.  See infra Section I.A. 
 33.  See infra Section I.B.1–2. 
 34.  879 F.3d 101 (4th Cir. 2018); see infra Section I.C.1. 
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tion-related disclosures, NIFLA v. Becerra,35 and the case below in the 
Ninth Circuit.36 
A.  The History of Abortion-Related Disclosures from Roe to Casey 
Following the legalization of abortion in Roe v. Wade,37 legal battles 
ensued testing the boundaries of this right.  Cases before the Supreme Court 
included issues regarding consent from spouses38 and parents;39 the use of 
federal funds;40 and the use of state-owned facilities and staff.41  The case 
history regarding abortion-related disclosures42 is especially important giv-
en the Becerra ruling.43 
Initially following Roe v. Wade, the Court did not allow any additional 
disclosure requirements to stand.44  While the Court upheld a state law re-
quiring informed consent from the person receiving the abortion in Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,45 it struck down provisions of 
an Akron ordinance in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health46 requiring the physician performing the procedure to inform their 
                                                 
 35.  138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); see infra Section I.C.2. 
 36.  839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); 
see infra Section I.C.3. 
 37.  410 U.S. 113 (1973).  The Court legalized abortion based on the historical right of priva-
cy it found to exist in the Constitution.  Id. at 152–53.  Specifically, the Court determined this 
right of privacy “encompass[ed] a [pregnant person’s] decision whether or not to terminate [their] 
pregnancy.”  Id. at 153.  However, the state still had a valid interest in preserving human life; 
therefore, the right to abortion remains subject to limitations.  Id. at 154.  
 38.  Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67–69 (1976) (overturning 
Missouri law requiring a married woman to get her husband’s consent for an abortion).  
 39.  Hodgson v. Minn., 497 U.S. 417, 423–24, 427 (1990) (overturning law requiring minors 
to notify both parents to obtain an abortion and instituting a judicial bypass procedure for minors 
to seek abortion without parental involvement).  
 40.  Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment restriction 
on the use of Medicaid funds for abortion except in cases of life endangerment, rape, or incest).  
 41.  Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989) (upholding the ban on 
use of public employees and facilities to perform abortions).  
 42.  The term “abortion-related disclosure” is used to encompass any requirement prior to an 
abortion in which a pregnant person must receive mandatory counseling or information, undergo a 
mandatory ultrasound, or wait a specific length of time between counseling and the procedure.  
See, e.g., Counseling and Waiting Periods, GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion (dis-
cussing states that require counseling and/or waiting periods before an abortion); Requirements for 
Ultrasound, supra note 19 (detailing states that mandate ultrasounds before an abortion). 
 43.  See infra Section I.C.  
 44.  See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) 
(affirming the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s judgment regarding the un-
constitutionality of sections of the Akron ordinance regulating abortions).  The ordinance required 
parental consent for minors seeking abortions, informed consent for all seeking an abortion, a 
twenty-four-hour waiting period, and the “humane and sanitary” disposal of fetal remains.  Id. at 
422–24 (quoting AKRON, OHIO CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 1870.16 (1978)).  
 45.  428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976). 
 46.  462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
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patient “of the status of [their] pregnancy, the development of [their] fetus, 
the date of possible viability, the physical and emotional complications that 
may result from an abortion, and the availability of agencies to provide 
[them] with assistance and information with respect to birth control, adop-
tion, and childbirth.”47  The Court found that the information required was 
“designed not to inform the [person]’s consent but rather to persuade [them] 
to withhold it altogether.”48  Additionally, the Akron ordinance restricted a 
physician’s ability to determine what information was relevant to a particu-
lar patient.49  Instead, the physician was hamstrung to provide potentially 
irrelevant information, including what the Court described as “a ‘parade of 
horribles’ intended to suggest that abortion is a particularly dangerous pro-
cedure.”50 
This logic led the Court to declare state laws requiring physicians to 
relay very specific, and potentially misleading, information to their patients 
prior to an abortion unconstitutional.51  In Thornburgh v. American College 
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,52 Pennsylvania passed legislation requir-
ing physicians to inform their pregnant patients seeking abortions at least 
twenty-four hours before consent is given that “there may be detrimental 
physical and psychological effects,” that medical assistance benefits may be 
available for the child’s care, and that the father of the child is liable to pro-
vide child support, among other requirements.53  Justice Blackmun writing 
for the majority stated, “Forcing the physician . . . to present the materi-
als . . . to the [pregnant person] makes [them] in effect an agent of the 
State . . . .”54  Additionally, the Court concluded much of the information 
that the law required the physician to discuss was not relevant to informed 
consent and, therefore, “advance[d] no legitimate state interest.”55 
However, the momentum of the Court shifted in 1992 with Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.56  The case involved 
the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982,57 which required informed 
consent, mandatory disclosures regarding abortion and its alternatives by a 
physician followed by a twenty-four-hour waiting period, informed consent 
of a parent for a minor’s abortion with a judicial bypass option, a require-
                                                 
 47.  Id. at 442 (citing AKRON, OHIO CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 1870.06(B)). 
 48.  Id. at 444. 
 49.  Id. at 444–45. 
 50.  Id. at 445. 
 51.  See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 
(1986) (holding that a twenty-four hour waiting period was unconstitutional).  
 52.  476 U.S. 747 (1986).  
 53.  Id. at 760–61 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205(b) (1982)). 
 54.  Id. at 763.  
 55.  Id.  
 56.  505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
 57.  1982 Pa. Laws 476. 
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ment for married women to certify that their husbands were informed of 
their abortion, and reporting requirements for facilities that provided abor-
tions.58  The Court split into several different factions, and Justices 
O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy authored the plurality opinion.59  Casey is 
most well-known for establishing the undue burden test, which allows the 
state to take steps to protect its interest in life and dissuade a person from 
having an abortion provided that those steps do not impose a “substantial 
obstacle.”60  Due to the plurality, several sections of the opinion did not 
gain the majority of the Court,61 including the section related to the provi-
sion that required a physician to apprise the patient “of the nature of the 
procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and the ‘proba-
ble gestational age of the unborn child.’”62  This provision also required the 
physician to notify the patient of the availability of printed materials regard-
ing the fetus’s development, child support requirements, and a list of adop-
tion agencies.63  Contrary to the Court’s previous ruling in Thornburgh, Jus-
tices O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy concluded that Pennsylvania’s 
interest in protecting life allowed the physician disclosure requirements to 
stand, as they were a “reasonable measure to ensure an informed choice.”64  
These Justices also state that Thornburgh and Akron went “too far” in find-
ing a constitutional violation in what they describe as “the giving of truth-
ful, nonmisleading information about the nature of the procedure, the at-
tendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational 
age’ of the fetus.”65  While Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylva-
nia argued that the physician disclosure requirements violated their First 
Amendment rights,66 Justices O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy indicated 
                                                 
 58.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 844. 
 59.  Id. at 843. 
 60.  Id. at 877. 
 61.  Id. at 841–42.  There was no majority for Section IV, see id. at 869, 872 (rejecting the 
trimester framework set forth in Roe v. Wade and discussing that the state’s interest may prohibit 
or restrict abortions after viability); Section V.B, see id. at 881 (discussing the informed consent 
requirement, including the twenty-four-hour waiting period); Section V.D, see id. at 899 (discuss-
ing the parental consent provision); or Section V.E, see id. at 900 (discussing the recordkeeping 
and reporting requirements), of the opinion.  
 62.  Id. at 881. 
 63.  Id.  
 64.  Id. at 883.  In Thornburgh, a similar requirement was struck down; the majority found 
that “[t]his type of compelled information is the antithesis of informed consent.”  476 U.S. at 764.  
In Akron, while the informed consent requirements were very similar to those seen in Casey (de-
velopment of fetus, physical and emotional complications, and the availability of agencies to help 
if the pregnant person decides not to terminate the pregnancy), the Court found that these disclo-
sure requirements went “beyond permissible limits.”  462 U.S. at 442–44.  
 65.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 882. 
 66.  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania argued that the requirements forced 
the physicians “[u]nder duress of law” to “recite a litany of government-mandated information.”  
Brief for Petitioner at 54, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-
744, 91-902).  Forcing the physician to relay specific information, no matter who the patient was 
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that since physicians, within the practice of medicine, are “subject to rea-
sonable licensing and regulation by the State,” no constitutional violation 
occurred.67  Under the newly introduced undue burden test, Justices 
O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy did not find the physician disclosure re-
quirements to be a “substantial obstacle to a [person] seeking an abortion” 
and, therefore, determined that the requirements did not constitute an undue 
burden and were constitutional.68 
Justices Stevens and Blackmun, while joining Justices O’Connor, 
Souter, and Kennedy for some sections of their opinion, both dissented re-
garding the section on the physician disclosure requirements.  Justice Ste-
vens found the disclosures not useful and, therefore, undue, as the statute 
did not allow for differences in situation or education and instead required 
the same information to be distributed to all patients across the board.69  He 
cautioned that “[w]henever government commands private citizens to speak 
or to listen, careful review of the justification for that command is particu-
larly appropriate.”70  Justice Blackmun, referencing sections of the Thorn-
burgh majority opinion in his dissent, maintained that the physician disclo-
sure requirements made the physician “in effect an agent of the State” and 
that the required disclosure information was not relevant to the patient’s in-
formed consent and, therefore, “advance[d] no legitimate state interest.”71  
While Casey clearly indicated a shift in the Supreme Court’s approach to 
abortion regulation, the federal circuit courts interpreted Casey’s impact in 
different ways. 
B.  The Circuit Split Following Casey and the Introduction of the 
Reasonableness Test 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Casey, a circuit split de-
veloped as to whether Casey established a test for abortion-related disclo-
sures.72  The United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Fifth Cir-
cuits determined that Casey established a “reasonableness” test, in addition 
to the undue burden test, specifically for abortion-related disclosures.73  
However, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth Cir-
                                                 
or what the individual circumstances were, went against the standard practice of the physician tai-
loring the information for each individual patient and their needs.  Id. at 51. 
 67.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977)). 
 68.  Id. at 884–85. 
 69.  Id. at 921 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 70.  Id.  
 71.  Id. at 935–36 (Blackmun J., dissenting) (quoting Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obste-
tricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762–63 (1986)). 
 72.  See NIFLA v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 837 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. NIFLA v. Becer-
ra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (discussing the circuit split regarding the proper test to apply to an 
abortion-related disclosure). 
 73.  See infra Section I.B.1. 
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cuits disagreed and did not believe that Casey established a test, instead us-
ing the intermediate scrutiny test for abortion-related disclosures.74 
1.  The Eighth and Fifth Circuits Adopt the Casey Reasonableness 
Test 
The Eighth and the Fifth Circuits found that Casey established a test 
for abortion-related disclosures based on the following line from the Casey 
plurality opinion: “If the information the State requires to be made available 
to the [pregnant person] is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may 
be permissible.”75  Additionally, as previously discussed, Justices 
O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy found that Thornburgh and Akron went 
“too far” when the Court found these abortion-related disclosures, which 
the Justices described as truthful and nonmisleading, to be unconstitution-
al.76  These three Justices also specify that the physician’s free speech rights 
are not violated by Casey’s abortion-related disclosure as it falls under the 
purview of state regulation.77  Following Casey, the Eighth and Fifth Circuit 
courts interpreted this language to develop a “reasonableness” test, which 
meant that future abortion-related disclosures only had to be considered 
truthful and not misleading to be constitutional, with no other considera-
tions.78 
In Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, North Dakota, & South Dakota 
v. Rounds,79 the Eighth Circuit reversed a preliminary injunction against a 
South Dakota bill80 that, among other requirements, specified that a physi-
cian must disclose to a patient “[t]hat the abortion will terminate the life of 
a whole, separate, unique, living human being.”81  The Eighth Circuit 
                                                 
 74.  See infra Section I.B.2. 
 75.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992); see Planned 
Parenthood of Minn., N.D., & S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734–35 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding 
“Casey and Gonzales establish that . . . [the state] can use its regulatory authority to require a phy-
sician to provide truthful, non-misleading information”); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abor-
tion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding under Casey and Gonzales that 
“informed consent laws that do not impose an undue burden on the [person]’s right to have an 
abortion are permissible if they require truthful, non-misleading, and relevant disclosures.”). 
 76.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 882. 
 77.  Id. at 884 (citations omitted).  
 78.  See Rounds, 530 F.3d at 726 (upholding South Dakota’s abortion-related disclosure); 
Lakey, 667 F.3d at 578 (upholding Texas’s abortion-related disclosure). 
 79.  530 F.3d 724, 734–35 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 80.  H.B. 1166, 2005 Leg., 80th Sess. (S.D. 2005). 
 81.  Rounds, 530 F.3d at 726 (quoting H.B. 1166, 2005 Leg., 80th Sess. (S.D. 2005)).  Addi-
tionally, the South Dakota bill required the physician to inform the prospective patient that the 
patient “ha[d] an existing relationship with that unborn human being,” and “[t]hat by having an 
abortion, [their] existing relationship and [their] existing constitutional rights with regards to that 
relationship will be terminated.”  Id. (quoting H.B. 1166, 2005 Leg., 80th Sess. (S.D. 2005)).  The 
physician also had to inform the patient that an abortion had “statistically significant risk factors,” 
including depression and increased risk of suicide.  Id. (quoting H.B. 1166, 2005 Leg., 80th Sess. 
(S.D. 2005))   
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agreed that requiring a physician to disclose certain information to a preg-
nant person before performing an abortion could implicate the physician’s 
First Amendment rights; however, the court found that since physicians are 
“subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State,” a disclosure 
requirement did not violate the First Amendment as long as the information 
in the disclosure was truthful and not misleading.82  Additionally, the court 
wrote that the state’s interest and “profound respect for the life within the 
[person]”83 meant that the court could, and would, uphold an abortion-
related disclosure “even if that information might also encourage the patient 
to choose childbirth over abortion.”84 
Four years later, the Fifth Circuit similarly reversed the grant of a pre-
liminary injunction against a Texas law in Texas Medical Providers Per-
forming Abortion Services v. Lakey.85  This law required physicians to “per-
form and display a sonogram of the fetus, make audible the heart 
auscultation of the fetus for the [person] to hear, and explain to [them] the 
results of each procedure.”86  Additionally, the law required a twenty-four-
hour waiting period and other common informed consent requirements that 
appeared across the country following the Casey ruling.87  The Fifth Circuit 
found that laws regarding abortion disclosures “are part of the state’s rea-
sonable regulation of medical practice and do not fall under the rubric of 
compelling ‘ideological’ speech that triggers First Amendment strict scruti-
ny.”88  Since the requirements of the bill, including the sonogram and 
heartbeat, “are the epitome of truthful, non-misleading information,” they 
are considered reasonable and not infringements upon the physician’s First 
Amendment rights.89  The Fifth Circuit, like the Eighth Circuit, quoted Ca-
sey regarding the state’s ability to “further the ‘legitimate goal of protecting 
the life of the unborn’”90 and upheld an abortion-related disclosure that re-
quired the physician to express the state’s preference for childbirth over 
abortion.91 
                                                 
 82.  Id. at 734–35, 738 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 884, 882).  The court also interpreted the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), to allow man-
dated disclosures to withstand First Amendment protections “even if that information might also 
encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion.”  Id. at 735. 
 83.  Id. at 734 (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157). 
 84.  Id. at 734–35. 
 85.  667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 86.  Id. at 573 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4) (West 2011)). 
 87.  The other requirements include completion of a form that the physician must maintain for 
seven years and the provision of educational materials about how to “establish paternity and se-
cure child support.”  Id. (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0123). 
 88.  Id. at 576. 
 89.  Id. at 578. 
 90.  Id. at 575 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 882). 
 91.  Id.  
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Under the Casey reasonableness test, as interpreted by the Eighth and 
Fifth Circuits, all that is required to withstand a First Amendment challenge 
is that an abortion-related disclosure contain information found truthful and 
non-misleading.92  Additionally, given the state’s interest in protecting life, 
it is permissible for the disclosure to favor or encourage childbirth over 
abortion.93  However, not all of the federal circuits agree with this interpre-
tation. 
2.  The Fourth Circuit Adopts the Intermediate Scrutiny Test 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed 
with the Fifth and Eighth Circuits that Casey established a reasonableness 
test to replace strict scrutiny regarding abortion-related disclosures and a 
physician’s First Amendment rights.94  Instead, the Fourth Circuit, and later 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, apply an interme-
diate scrutiny test.95 
When the First Amendment is implicated, different levels of scrutiny 
may be applied to the law or regulation in question96—rational basis,97 in-
termediate scrutiny,98 or strict scrutiny.99  When a First Amendment case 
applies intermediate scrutiny, it first determines whether the law or regula-
tion in question is content-based or “draws distinctions based on the mes-
sage a speaker conveys.”100  While content-based laws are presumptively 
unconstitutional,101 Supreme Court precedent, such as Casey, recognized 
that the state can nonetheless regulate physicians and their First Amend-
ment speech regarding abortion.102  The next inquiry is whether the law or 
regulation is viewpoint neutral or viewpoint discriminatory; if a law or reg-
ulation is viewpoint discriminatory, it is “based on ‘the specific motivating 
                                                 
 92.  See supra notes 84 & 94 and accompanying text.  
 93.  See supra notes 85–86 and infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 94.  Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 248 (4th Cir. 2014).  
 95.  Id. at 249; NIFLA v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 834 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. NIFLA v. 
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 96.  See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994) (“[B]ecause not every interfer-
ence with speech triggers the same degree of scrutiny under the First Amendment, we must decide 
at the outset the level of scrutiny applicable . . . .”). 
 97.  Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955).  Rational basis 
requires only that the legislation rationally might have been carried out to meet a state interest.  Id. 
 98.  Also referred to as heightened scrutiny, the law “must serve important governmental ob-
jectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”  Craig v. Boren, 
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).  While the Supreme Court has utilized the intermediate scrutiny test in 
relation to gender discriminatory laws, appellate courts have used it in First Amendment cases.  
Stuart, 774 F.3d at 248. 
 99.  To survive strict scrutiny, the law or regulation must be ‘“narrowly tailored’ to achieve a 
‘compelling’ government interest.”  Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (quoting Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)). 
 100.  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015). 
 101.  Id. at 2226. 
 102.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992). 
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ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker.’”103  If a law or regu-
lation involving speech by a professional, such as a physician, is found to 
be both content-based and viewpoint-discriminatory, the Ninth Circuit out-
lines a continuum of First Amendment protected speech.104  When a profes-
sional speaks to add to the public dialogue and no more, they are afforded 
First Amendment rights as any other person who added to the public dia-
logue; to regulate this speech would require strict scrutiny.105  However, as 
discussed previously in Casey, the state also has the power to heavily regu-
late professional conduct, like medical treatment.  In this case, the First 
Amendment protections are significantly weaker, falling under rational ba-
sis.106  Required disclosures, such as abortion-related disclosures, fall in be-
tween the two poles—while they are not public dialogue, they are also not 
professional conduct.  Given this midpoint, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits 
believe that intermediate scrutiny is the most appropriate test to use when 
analyzing the constitutionality of abortion-related disclosures.107  This test 
reviews the law or regulation to determine if it “directly advances a substan-
tial governmental interest and that the measure is drawn to achieve that in-
terest.”108 
The Fourth Circuit became the first circuit court to utilize the interme-
diate scrutiny test for an abortion-related disclosure.  Two years after the 
Fifth Circuit ruled in Lakey, a similar state law came before the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Stuart v. Camnitz.109  Like the Texas law, this North Carolina law 
required physicians to “perform an ultrasound, display the sonogram, and 
describe the fetus” in addition to offering the option to hear the heart 
tone.110  But the Fourth Circuit did not agree that Casey established a rea-
sonableness test for physicians’ First Amendment rights when it came to 
abortion-related disclosures; instead, the court interpreted Casey as stating 
that in that particular case, the physicians’ First Amendment rights were not 
                                                 
 103.  Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 
515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)).  Reed finds that viewpoint-discriminatory laws or regulations are an 
“egregious form of content discrimination” and are, therefore, presumptively unconstitutional.  Id. 
(quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829).   
 104.  See Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1053–55 (9th Cir. 2013) (outlining the protected 
speech continuum for professionals).  The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
also subscribes to this continuum of speech used by the Ninth Circuit.  Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 
238, 248 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 105.  Pickup, 728 F.3d at 1053. 
 106.  Id. at 1055. 
 107.  See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 245 (“Recognizing that the Requirement both compelled speech 
and regulated the medical profession, the court applied neither strict scrutiny nor rational basis 
review, but rather the intermediate scrutiny standard . . . .”); NIFLA v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 839 
(9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 108.  Harris, 839 F.3d at 841 (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 572 (2011)). 
 109.  774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014).  The state law in this case was from North Carolina.  Id. at 
242; see supra note 86 and accompanying text; and infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 110.  Id. at 242–43. 
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at risk.111  In the instant case, the Fourth Circuit found that under the North 
Carolina law, physicians’ First Amendment rights were implicated because 
the physician was required to take actions and speak certain information, 
whether or not they felt it was psychologically safe to do so with a particu-
lar patient and whether or not that patient wanted to hear what the physician 
was saying.112  The court conceded that the state may regulate the medical 
profession; however, a physician’s First Amendment rights exist on a con-
tinuum between “public dialogue” and “regulation of professional conduct,” 
necessitating different levels of scrutiny depending on the situation.113  
Here, the Fourth Circuit found that the North Carolina law was content-
based and, while admitting that the protection of life is a valid and im-
portant state interest, did not believe the law in question was drawn narrow-
ly enough to avoid “impeding too greatly on individual liberty interests.”114  
The Fourth Circuit found the law exceeded the confines of the Pennsylvania 
abortion-related disclosure law the Supreme Court found constitutional in 
Casey.115  The physician requirements imposed by the Pennsylvania law, 
the Fourth Circuit reasoned, “deviate[d] only modestly from traditional in-
formed consent,”116 while the additional requirements imposed by the North 
Carolina law, specifically the forced sonogram viewing and verbal descrip-
tion, impermissibly “[t]ransform[] the physician into the mouthpiece of the 
state.”117  The requirements took what should be an open dialogue between 
a physician and their patient and turned it into a lecture by the physician 
with no possibility to frame the conversation with the information most rel-
evant to that particular patient.118  Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held the 
North Carolina law violated the First Amendment rights of the physicians 
                                                 
 111.  Id. at 249 “[T]he plurality simply stated that it saw ‘no constitutional infirmity in the re-
quirement that the physician provide the information mandated by the State here.’ (quoting Casey, 
505 U.S. at 884)). 
 112.  Id. at 250.  There were no exceptions listed in the law for the requirements, except for a 
medical emergency.  Id. at 243.  The physician was required to continue sharing the required in-
formation even if the patient covered their eyes and ears.  Id. 
 113.  Id. at 248 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pickup v. Brown 740 F.3d 1208, 1227, 1229 (9th 
Cir. 2013).  The Ninth Circuit describes this continuum further.  First Amendment protection is 
greatest in the “public dialogue” side of the continuum and slides to “professional conduct,” which 
includes forms of treatment, where the state’s power to regulate is greater.  Harris, 839 F.3d at 
839 (quoting Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1227–29).  
 114.  Stuart, 774 F.3d at 246–50. 
 115.  Id. at 250. 
 116.  Id. at 252.  Informed consent, established to ensure that patients make autonomous choic-
es about their own body, requires that physicians give patients information regarding “the diagno-
sis, the prognosis, alternative treatment options (including no treatment), and the risks and likely 
results of each option.”  Id. at 251.  In Casey, the abortion-related disclosures deviate from in-
formed consent because they additionally require the physician to inform the person of the gesta-
tional age of the fetus and let them know of additional state materials they can review if they wish 
regarding available resources if the person decides not to get an abortion.  Id. at 252. 
 117.  Id. at 253–54. 
 118.  Id. 
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and affirmed the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction.119  How-
ever, as discussed below, the Fourth Circuit came to a different conclusion 
in Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Bal-
timore.120 
C.  Abortion-Related Disclosure with a “Twist”: Requiring Disclosure 
for Crisis Pregnancy Centers Instead of Abortion Providers 
After Roe v. Wade legalized abortion, states often attempted to require 
abortion providers to disclose information to a person seeking an abor-
tion121—especially after the change to the undue burden standard in Ca-
sey.122  However, states and cities began requiring abortion-related disclo-
sures on the “flip side”: Instead of requiring abortion providers to disclose 
information to those seeking abortions, those organizations seeking to pre-
vent and reduce abortions (namely, crisis pregnancy centers) were required 
to disclose that abortions were available in other locations or were not 
available at that location.123  Specifically, this occurred in Baltimore, Mary-
land124 and most recently in California.125 
1.  The Maryland Connection: Greater Baltimore Center for 
Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore 
Both Baltimore City and the State of California attempted to shift the 
onus of the abortion-related disclosure from the previous model; instead of 
tasking the abortion provider with delivering a variety of state-required 
messaging regarding the risks of abortion, Baltimore City and California 
required crisis pregnancy centers to inform their clients of services not pro-
vided by the centers.126  However, both cases for the disclosure were ulti-
mately unsuccessful. 
                                                 
 119.  Id. at 256. 
 120.  879 F.3d 101 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 121.  See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 422–24 
(1983) (requiring the physician to “make certain specified statements to the patient”). 
 122.  See An Overview of Abortion Laws, supra note 18 (highlighting the many states that re-
quire state-mandated counseling and other requirements prior to an abortion). 
 123.  See, e.g., Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 879 F.3d 101, 
106 (4th Cir. 2018) (discussing the city’s requirement that crisis pregnancy centers post a notice in 
their waiting room indicating they do not offer abortion services); NIFLA v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 
830 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom, NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (discussing the 
state’s requirement that crisis pregnancy centers, along with other licensed and unlicensed preg-
nancy centers, display information regarding state abortion services). 
 124.  See infra Section I.C.1. 
 125.  See infra Section I.C.2–3. 
 126.  Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc., 879 F.3d at 106; Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 
2368.  
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In 2009, Baltimore enacted City Ordinance 09-252 requiring any lim-
ited service pregnancy center to post a conspicuous disclaimer in the wait-
ing room in both English and Spanish stating that the center “does not pro-
vide or make referral for abortion or birth-control services.”127  Given the 
clear targeting of limited service pregnancy centers (otherwise known as 
crisis pregnancy centers), the ordinance was neither facility-neutral nor au-
dience-neutral.128  The Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns, a 
crisis pregnancy center that did not refer for abortions, filed an injunction, 
citing First Amendment free speech violations.129  The Fourth Circuit ulti-
mately decided that the ordinance regulated neither commercial speech nor 
professional speech.130  It found the ordinance to be both content-based and 
viewpoint-discriminatory, as it applied only to pregnancy-related service 
facilities and no other parties.131  Given these findings, the Fourth Circuit 
reviewed the ordinance under the strict scrutiny standard.132  While the 
court agreed that “[t]he City’s interests are plainly important,” they found a 
lack of hard evidence proving the ordinance was necessary to correct the 
effect of deceptive advertising on behalf of the crisis pregnancy centers.133  
Additionally, the court remained unconvinced that the City could not enact 
less restrictive requirements to reach its goal, such as a public information 
campaign, rather than requiring the crisis pregnancy centers to publish in-
formation counter to its mission.134  Although the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari, the Court granted certiorari for an abortion-related disclosure 
case that also flipped the disclosure onto crisis pregnancy centers rather 
than abortion providers in the 2017 term.135 
                                                 
 127.  Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc., 879 F.3d at 106 (quoting Balt. City 
Health Code §§ 3-501 to 3-506 (2010)). 
 128.  The ordinance defined “limited-service pregnancy center” as “any entity ‘whose primary 
purpose is to provide pregnancy-related services’ . . . but ‘does not provide or refer for’ abortions 
or ‘nondirective and comprehensive’ birth control.”  Id. at 106 (quoting Balt. City Health Code 
§ 3-501). 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. at 108–09. 
 131.  Id. at 112. 
 132.  Id. at 111.  The strict scrutiny test “requires that compelled disclosures be ‘narrowly tai-
lored’ to achieve a ‘weighty’ government interest.”  Id. (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind 
of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 798 (1988)). 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. at 112. 
 135.  Mayor of Balt. v. Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2710 
(2018); see infra Section I.C.3. 
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2.  NIFLA v. Harris: The Ninth Circuit Finds California’s 
Abortion-Related Disclosure for Crisis Pregnancy Centers to 
Withstand Intermediate Scrutiny 
In NIFLA v. Harris,136 which subsequently went to the Supreme Court 
as NIFLA v. Becerra,137 the onus of the abortion-related disclosure again 
shifted from the abortion provider to crisis pregnancy centers.  The Califor-
nia legislature passed the California Freedom, Accountability, Comprehen-
sive Care, and Transparency Act (“FACT Act”) to ensure that “[a]ll Cali-
fornia [people], regardless of income, . . . have access to reproductive health 
services.”138  Research suggested that thousands of people were unaware of 
public state-funded family planning programs, including abortion.139  Due 
to the time-sensitive nature of pregnancy, especially if the pregnant person 
wishes to consider abortion, the legislature found the most effective way to 
give pregnant people notice about state-funded programs was to require li-
censed pregnancy-related clinics to inform their pregnant clients of these 
programs.140  This “Licensed Notice,” to be posted conspicuously in a wait-
ing area or given to each client in printed or digital form, read: “California 
has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access to com-
prehensive family planning services (including all FDA-approved methods 
of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible [people].  To de-
termine whether you qualify, contact the county social services office at [in-
sert the telephone number].”141  Additionally, the legislature found that cri-
sis pregnancy centers, which “aim to discourage and prevent [people] from 
seeking abortions,” interfered with a person’s “ability to be fully informed 
and exercise their reproductive rights.”142  These centers sometimes por-
trayed themselves as health clinics when they actually held no licensure 
with the state.143  To address this problem, the FACT Act required unli-
censed clinics to provide a second notice, known as the “Unlicensed No-
tice,” to clients on site and in any advertising: “This facility is not licensed 
as a medical facility by the State of California and has no licensed medical 
provider who provides or directly supervises the provision of services.”144  
The National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (“NIFLA”), along with 
                                                 
 136.  839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 137.  138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 138.  Harris, 839 F.3d at 829 (first and third alterations in original) (quoting FACT Act, A.B. 
No. 775 §1(a), 2015 Cal. Stat. 5351, 5352). 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. at 830. 
 141.  Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting 2015 Cal Stat. 5351, 5353). 
 142.  Id. at 829 (quoting Cal. Assem. Comm. on Health, Analysis, AB 775, 2015–2016 Leg., 
Reg. Sess., at 3 (2015). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. at 830 (quoting 2015 Cal. Stat. 5351, 5354).  
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other crisis pregnancy center organizations, challenged the two notices as 
unconstitutional on First Amendment free speech grounds.145 
The Ninth Circuit found that both the Licensed Notice and the Unli-
censed Notice passed First Amendment requirements regarding abortion-
related disclosures.146  The Ninth Circuit, like the Fourth Circuit, stated that 
Casey did not establish a reasonableness rule regarding the level of scrutiny 
courts must apply to abortion-related disclosures and instead applied the 
continuum approach used in Stuart.147  The court found the FACT Act to be 
content-based but not viewpoint discriminatory.148  While the Ninth Circuit 
admitted that compelling the pregnancy-related facilities to post the Li-
censed or Unlicensed Notice when the facilities might not otherwise post 
them “necessarily alters the content of the speech,” the Notices were not 
viewpoint discriminatory because all pregnancy-related facilities had to post 
them, regardless of their ideology or personal feelings towards abortion.149  
Following this determination, the court found that intermediate scrutiny was 
appropriate for the Licensed Notice as it fell in the middle of the continu-
um, affording the medical professional some First Amendment protection 
while recognizing that the protection is diminished within the confines of a 
professional relationship.150  Additionally, the Licensed Notice survived in-
termediate scrutiny since the state has substantial interest in the health of its 
citizens and ensuring they have access to state-sponsored medical services 
including abortion.151  The Licensed Notice was drawn to achieve this state 
interest because it only informed readers of the services and did not encour-
age their use.152  While NIFLA argued that the state could find other ways 
to disseminate the Licensed Notice information, such as a public infor-
mation campaign, the Ninth Circuit found that given the time-sensitive na-
ture of pregnancy, an effective way to let pregnant people know about the 
services was to inform them anytime they went to a clinic.153  Additionally, 
the court found that the Unlicensed Notice survived any level of review, 
                                                 
 145.  Id. at 831. 
 146.  Id. at 841, 843. 
 147.  Id. at 837–39. 
 148.  Id. at 835. 
 149.  Id. (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988)). 
 150.  Id. at 840. 
 151.  Id. at 841.  
 152.  Id. at 842. 
 153.  Id.  Additionally, since the court was using intermediate scrutiny, there was no require-
ment for the state to use the least restrictive means possible to communicate their message as there 
had been in other cases reviewed under strict scrutiny.  See, e.g., Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of 
N.Y., 740 F.3d 233, 250 (2d Cir. 2014) (striking down the New York City Department of Health 
and Mental Hygiene’s regulation encouraging pregnant people to consult with a licensed provider 
under strict scrutiny, stating that the government could use an advertising campaign); Centro Tep-
eyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184, 190–91 (4th Cir. 2013) (striking down a county ordi-
nance similar to Evergreen under strict scrutiny, finding the government had “several options less 
restrictive than compelled speech” (quoting Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 779 F. Supp. 2d 
456, 469 n.9 (D. Md. 2011))). 
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even strict scrutiny, since the state has a compelling interest to make sure its 
citizens know whether a clinic is licensed or not before entrusting that clinic 
with their wellbeing.154  NIFLA appealed the Ninth Circuit’s opinion. 
3.  NIFLA v. Becerra: On Appeal, the Supreme Court Reversed the 
Ninth Circuit but Failed to Resolve the Circuit Split Regarding 
the Casey Reasonableness Test 
On appeal from the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court granted certiora-
ri and heard NIFLA v. Becerra.155  The Court determined that the Licensed 
Notice constituted a content-based regulation of speech, as it “compell[ed] 
individuals to speak a particular message” and, therefore, “alte[r] the con-
tent of [their] speech.”156  The Court indicated that content-based regula-
tions cannot be imposed by the state unless there is persuasive evidence of a 
long-standing tradition of such restriction; in this case, the Court was not 
persuaded.157  The Court also failed to find that the notices fell under the 
umbrella of commercial speech, another sub-category afforded less protec-
tion under the First Amendment.158 
However, even if a separate category of speech did exist and applied to 
the notice, the Court found the Licensed Notice did not meet intermediate 
scrutiny, let alone strict scrutiny.159  While the legislature’s stated goal was 
to reach people who were unfamiliar with the state services, the Licensed 
Notice only applied to pregnancy-specific clinics, not all clinics.160  Given 
this goal, why would the legislature require the notice only in a narrow sub-
set of clinics?161  Therefore, the Court found that NIFLA and the other peti-
tioners were likely to succeed on the merits of their Licensed Notice chal-
lenge.162 
The Court found the Unlicensed Notice to be unjustified and unduly 
burdensome.163  The Court described the state’s justification for the notice 
as “purely hypothetical” and found that imposing this notice requirement 
only on unlicensed pregnancy-related clinics and not on other unlicensed 
clinics distinguished between the speech of different speakers (or in this 
case, different clinics), making it viewpoint discriminatory.164  Additional-
                                                 
 154.  Id. at 843.  
 155.  138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018), rev’g NIFLA v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 156.  Id. at 2380 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of 
Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988)).  
 157.  Id. at 2372. 
 158.  Id.  
 159.  Id. at 2375.  
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at 2376.  
 162.  Id.  
 163.  Id. at 2377. 
 164.  Id. at 2377–78. 
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ly, the Court found the Unlicensed Notice burdensome as the notice applied 
to all print and digital advertising and one California county required dis-
closures to be in thirteen languages.165  Therefore, the Court also found the 
petitioners were likely to succeed on the merits of their Unlicensed Notice 
challenge.166 
While the Supreme Court decided Becerra in the opposite fashion of 
the Ninth Circuit, the Court did not resolve the circuit split regarding 
whether Casey established a reasonableness test for physician abortion-
related disclosures.  The number of these abortion-related disclosures grew 
exponentially following Casey, but confusion remains regarding which dis-
closures are constitutional and which are not.167  While the Supreme Court 
could have taken Becerra as an opportunity to resolve the circuit split re-
garding whether Casey instituted a new test for abortion-related disclosures, 
the Court did not resolve this split.168  Additionally, as Baltimore City and 
California have tried to flip abortion-related disclosures and place the onus 
on those who wish to avoid or deter abortions rather than on those who 
wish to perform or undergo an abortion, they have not been successful.169 
II.  ANALYSIS 
Given the lack of success in targeting abortion-related disclosures at 
crisis pregnancy centers,170 it may be time to consider a new and novel ap-
proach.  The Maryland General Assembly should create a Pregnancy Dis-
closure, a written document to be distributed when a person is first diag-
nosed as pregnant or when a person first reports their pregnancy, that details 
the full range of available resources and the potential risks of both abortion 
and childbirth in order to fully inform a pregnant person of their options.  In 
Section II.A, this analysis begins with a discussion of the elements and 
format of the Pregnancy Disclosure.171  Section II.B then explains the prec-
edents that indicate the constitutionality of the Pregnancy Disclosure.172  
Lastly, Section II.C discusses why the Pregnancy Disclosure has constitu-
tional advantages.173 
                                                 
 165.  Id. at 2378. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  See supra note 24. 
 168.  NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 169.  See, e.g., id. at 2378 (finding that NIFLA were “likely to succeed on the merits of their 
claim that the FACT Act violates the First Amendment”); Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Con-
cerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 879 F.3d 101, 113 (4th Cir. 2018) (finding that the city “fails to sat-
isfy heightened First Amendment scrutiny”). 
 170.  See supra note 169. 
 171.  See infra Section II.A. 
 172.  See infra Section II.B.1–2. 
 173.  See infra Section II.C. 
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A.  Elements and Format of the Pregnancy Disclosure 
Health care facility personnel or pregnancy-related facility personnel, 
whenever a person is either first diagnosed as pregnant or first reports their 
pregnancy, should provide the Pregnancy Disclosure in a written format.  
While the written format still requires the facility personnel to provide in-
formation they may not agree with, it allows the pregnant person and the 
facility personnel to engage in a conversation appropriate to the individual 
pregnant person’s questions and concerns.174  The facility personnel should 
provide the Pregnancy Disclosure in the person’s preferred language and 
may provide an electronic or digital copy unless the person requests a hard 
copy.175  The health care facility could mean any facility governed by the 
Maryland Office of Health Care Quality176 or a licensed physician’s office 
or practice.177  Additionally, the requirements determining a pregnancy-
related facility should be similar to those found in California’s FACT Act 
discussed in NIFLA v. Becerra to capture any place of business that may in-
teract with pregnant people and fall outside of the health care facility cate-
gory.178  Therefore, the Pregnancy Disclosure will be facility-neutral, unlike 
other abortion-related disclosures that targeted crisis pregnancy centers.179  
The Pregnancy Disclosure will also be audience-neutral, as it will not target 
pregnant people who have expressed their wish to have an abortion.180 
                                                 
 174.  The lack of a required verbal disclosure by the physician differentiates the Pregnancy 
Disclosure from the North Carolina law ruled unconstitutional in Stuart v. Camnitz, which re-
quired the physician to verbally describe the fetus in detail while displaying an ultrasound image, 
even if the pregnant person did not want to hear or see it.  774 F.3d 238, 243 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 175.  Regarding translation, see MD. CODE ANN., State Gov’t § 10-1103 (2018) for state ser-
vices.  The Pregnancy Disclosure could be provided through the Department of Health.  
 176.  Such as freestanding birthing centers (MD. CODE REGS. 10.05.02 (2017)), Acute General 
Hospitals and Special Hospitals (MD. CODE REGS. 10.07.01 (2018)), and Surgical Abortion Facili-
ties (MD. CODE REGS. 10.12.01 (2017)). 
 177.  Including physicians’ services (MD. CODE REGS.10.09.02 (2018)) and freestanding clin-
ics (MD. CODE REGS. 10.09.08 (2018)). 
 178.  If the facility provides two or more of the following, they should be considered a preg-
nancy-related facility and subject to the Pregnancy Disclosure requirements: (1) offers pregnancy 
testing/diagnosis; (2) offers ultrasounds, sonograms, or prenatal care; (3) advertises or solicits pa-
trons with offers to provide sonography, tests, counseling; (4) offers abortion services; (5) staff or 
volunteers collect health information from clients. NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2369 
(2018).  
 179.  In Becerra, the FACT Act specifically attempted to regulate crisis pregnancy centers, 
which the California State Assembly defined as “pro-life (largely Christian belief-based) organiza-
tions that offer a limited range of free pregnancy options, counseling, and other services.”  138 S. 
Ct. at 2368 (quoting WATTERS ET AL., PREGNANCY RESOURCE CENTERS: ENSURING ACCESS AND 
ACCURACY OF INFORMATION 4 (2011)).  In Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns, 
Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, the Baltimore City ordinance applied only to “limited-service preg-
nancy centers” that provided pregnancy-related information but did not refer for abortions or 
comprehensive birth control.  879 F.3d 101, 106 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting BALT. CITY HEALTH 
CODE §§ 3-501–3-506 (2010)).  
 180.  In Casey, Lakey, and Rounds, the disclosures in question were required of physicians be-
fore performing an abortion.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992); 
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The Pregnancy Disclosure should include pregnancy-related resources 
within either the county or the state, including but not limited to abortion 
providers, crisis pregnancy centers, and adoption agencies, and provide the 
names of the resources, services provided at each resource, and contact in-
formation.  The Pregnancy Disclosure should also contain informed consent 
information for both abortion and childbirth, including the scientifically 
valid risks and potential side effects of both.181  A physician or other health 
care provider, before performing an abortion procedure or before acting as a 
pregnant person’s obstetrician, nurse-midwife, or otherwise delivering a 
baby should ensure that their patient has read and understood the infor-
mation contained in the Pregnancy Disclosure regarding the upcoming pro-
cedure.182  While these requirements necessitate health care providers pass-
ing on a fair amount of information on the state’s behalf, the Pregnancy 
Disclosure will likely be constitutionally sound.183 
B.  The Pregnancy Disclosure Meets Both the Reasonableness Test and 
the Intermediate Scrutiny Test 
Regardless of whether the Supreme Court decides if Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey established a new test 
for abortion-related disclosures184 or if the intermediate scrutiny test used 
by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits is more appropriate,185 the Pregnancy Dis-
closure is constitutional.  The Pregnancy Disclosure does not discriminate 
regarding what types of facilities must provide the Pregnancy Disclosure, 
unlike the FACT Act in Becerra or the Baltimore City Ordinance in Great-
er Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of 
Baltimore.186  While both of these laws targeted crisis pregnancy centers, 
                                                 
Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 2012); 
Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., & S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 2008).  
 181.  Currently, thirty states do require that information regarding the health risks of continu-
ing a pregnancy are included in an abortion-related disclosure.  Counseling and Waiting Periods 
for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/state-
policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion.  However, several states’ disclosures 
include inaccurate or scientifically invalid information and risks associated with abortion.  See 
supra note 18. 
 182.  This is standard for informed consent—to ensure that the patient read and understood the 
risks and potential side effects of a medical procedure.  Informed Consent, AMERICAN MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION, https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/informed-consent (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2019).  
 183.  Currently, a Maryland law exists stating that a provider or hospital cannot be required to 
refer for abortion.  MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214 (West 2018).  However, it may be 
overcome given the facility-neutral and audience-neutral approach of the Pregnancy Disclosure.  
Both liberal and conservative state representatives have an interest in passing the Pregnancy Dis-
closure since it includes information about abortion services, but also includes information about 
faith-based groups like crisis pregnancy centers and about the risks of abortion. 
 184.  See infra Section II.B.1. 
 185.  See infra Section II.B.2. 
 186.  See supra note 179. 
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the Pregnancy Disclosure expands to all pregnancy-related facilities and al-
so other health care facilities that are not pregnancy specific.  Instead of 
warning those people going to crisis pregnancy centers, the Pregnancy Dis-
closure takes a holistic approach to educating pregnant people early regard-
ing the available resources and risks of either abortion or childbirth.  While 
the Pregnancy Disclosure requires the facility personnel to deliver the 
state’s message, doing so in a written format like the Pregnancy Disclosure 
is less invasive to the facility personnel’s First Amendment rights than re-
quiring a verbal disclosure.187  Having defined the terms of the Pregnancy 
Disclosure, it can be examined more closely under both the Casey reasona-
bleness test and the intermediate scrutiny test. 
1.  The Pregnancy Disclosure Meets the Casey Reasonableness Test 
Since It Is Truthful and Nonmisleading 
Given that Maryland will most likely be subjected to the intermediate 
scrutiny test, the Pregnancy Disclosure should stand.188  However, even if a 
future Supreme Court solidifies that Casey established a reasonableness 
abortion-related disclosure test, the Pregnancy Disclosure should still sur-
pass these test requirements.  As previously discussed,189 since physicians 
are “subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State,”190 the Fifth 
and Eighth Circuit Courts find that language in Casey established a reason-
ableness test that only requires the abortion-related disclosure to be truthful 
and non-misleading to withstand a First Amendment claim.191  In this case, 
the Pregnancy Disclosure will contain only factual and scientifically valid 
information regarding both abortion and childbirth risks.  It will not contain 
any encouragement regarding which path a pregnant person should choose.  
While Casey states that the disclosure will be allowed even when “the State 
expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion,”192 there should be no 
encouragement of neither childbirth nor abortion in this Pregnancy Disclo-
                                                 
 187.  See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 253 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The coercive effects of the 
speech are magnified when the physician is compelled to deliver the state’s preferred message in 
his or her own voice.  This Requirement treads far more heavily on the physicians’ free speech 
rights than the state pamphlet provisions at issue in Casey.”). 
 188.  Maryland is in the Fourth Circuit, which chose to use the intermediate scrutiny test and 
found that Casey did not establish a new test for abortion-related disclosures.  Stuart v. Camnitz, 
774 F.3d 238, 248 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 189.  See supra Section I.B.1. 
 190.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992). 
 191.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., & S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734 (8th 
Cir. 2008) (finding South Dakota’s abortion-related disclosure to be truthful and nonmisleading); 
Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(finding Texas’s abortion-related disclosure to be truthful and nonmisleading). 
 192.  505 U.S. at 882. 
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sure.193  Therefore, given the straightforward nature of the reasonableness 
test, the Pregnancy Disclosure should be found constitutional. 
2.  The Pregnancy Disclosure Meets the Intermediate Scrutiny Test 
Because There Is a Significant Government Interest and the 
Disclosure Addresses That Interest 
The Fourth Circuit upheld the intermediate scrutiny test for abortion-
related disclosures in Stuart v. Camnitz.194  Therefore, given that Maryland 
falls within the Fourth Circuit, it is most likely that the Pregnancy Disclo-
sure would be reviewed under intermediate scrutiny. 
To begin, it first must be determined whether the law or regulation is 
content-based.195  Because the Pregnancy Disclosure requires all health care 
facilities and pregnancy-related facilities to provide information that they 
might not otherwise provide, it qualifies as content-based.196  In this case, 
the content-based nature of the Pregnancy Disclosure is not dispositive ac-
cording to the Fourth and Ninth Circuits.197  The next point to consider is 
whether the law is viewpoint discriminatory.198  If the law is found to be 
viewpoint discriminatory, it is presumptively unconstitutional.199  In this 
case, the Pregnancy Disclosure does not promote one ideological view over 
another.200  No viewpoint or encouragement is offered; rather, only re-
sources and scientifically valid information regarding pregnancy, abortion, 
and childbirth. 
Since the Pregnancy Disclosure is content-based but viewpoint neutral, 
the First Amendment analysis can proceed.  On the continuum of First 
                                                 
 193.  This differentiates the Pregnancy Disclosure from another Maryland case, Centro Tep-
eyac v. Montgomery County, 722 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2013), in which the county disclosure encour-
aged pregnant people to consult with a licensed health care provider. 
 194.  See supra Section I.B.2. 
 195.  “A regulation discriminates based on content when ‘on its face,’ the regulation ‘draws 
distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys.’”  NIFLA v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 835 (9th 
Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (quoting Reed v. Town of 
Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015)). 
 196.  In fact, no health care facility or pregnancy-related facility would be likely to provide all 
of the information found in the Pregnancy Disclosure.  It is likely that the abortion services pro-
viders would not normally provide information about crisis pregnancy centers and vice versa.  
 197.  See, e.g., Stuart, 774 F.3d at 245 (discussing that abortion-related disclosures that are 
content-based may still be valid); Harris, 839 F.3d at 834 (finding content-based disclosures can 
continue through the First Amendment analysis). 
 198.  Viewpoint discriminatory means that the law is “based on ‘the specific motivating ideol-
ogy or the opinion or perspective of the speaker.’” Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230 (quoting Rosenberger 
v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)). 
 199.  Reed finds that viewpoint-discriminatory laws or regulations are an “egregious form of 
content discrimination” and, therefore, presumptively unconstitutional.  Id. (quoting Rosenberger, 
515 U.S. at 829). 
 200.  While both abortion service providers and crisis pregnancy centers are listed in the in-
formation section of the Disclosure, and the risks of abortion are included in the informed consent 
section of the Disclosure, there is no ideological view expressed.  
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Amendment scrutiny methodology, the Pregnancy Disclosure falls in the 
middle; while it does not constitute professional conduct or treatment, it is 
also not public dialogue.201  Substantial regulation is allowed since profes-
sionals are advancing the welfare of their patients, not contributing to pub-
lic debate, when engaging in a patient-physician relationship.202  Because 
the Pregnancy Disclosure falls at the midpoint, the appropriate level of 
scrutiny is neither strict scrutiny, used in a public dialogue context, or ra-
tional basis, which gives great state power and control.203  Rather, the ap-
propriate test is intermediate scrutiny, which requires that the Pregnancy 
Disclosure advance a substantial government interest and that the disclosure 
is drawn to achieve that interest.204 
The Pregnancy Disclosure advances a significant government interest 
in making sure all pregnant people are aware of all available options regard-
ing their pregnancy and are informed of the potential risks and side effects 
of medical procedures such as abortion.  As previously stated, fifty-eight 
percent, or more than 70,000, of total pregnancies in Maryland were unin-
tended in 2010;205 when more than half of the pregnant population of the 
state did not plan for that pregnancy, there is a high likelihood that some of 
these pregnant people may be unaware of the options and resources.  It is 
clearly a significant government interest to ensure these pregnant Mary-
landers understand these options, including abortion, and the resources 
available to them.  Given the time sensitive nature of pregnancy, it is also 
vital that pregnant people receive this information as soon as possible; 
therefore, as reasoned in California’s FACT Act, the best way to reach these 
pregnant people is through health care facilities or pregnancy-related facili-
ties.206  While the Pregnancy Disclosure is required more widely across all 
health care facilities and pregnancy-related facilities unlike previous abor-
tion-related disclosures, this audience-neutral and facility-neutral wide net 
allows the pregnant person to be informed of all their options as early as 
possible.207  With the Pregnancy Disclosure, pregnant people are informed 
of all their options and the risks of both abortion and childbirth as soon as 
the pregnancy becomes known to the health care provider.  Whether the 
person decides to have an abortion or carry the child to term, the Pregnancy 
                                                 
 201.  See Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1053–55 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that there is a 
middle ground for professionals such as physicians that falls between public dialogue and profes-
sional conduct). 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 572 (2011).  
 205.  See KOST, supra note 2. 
 206.  NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2369 (2018). 
 207.  Abortion-related disclosures like Pennsylvania’s in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey do not take effect until a person has expressed their wish to have an abor-
tion.  505 U.S. at 844. 
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Disclosure unveils valuable information and resources to make the decision 
as soon as possible and with all the necessary information in a format that 
does not encourage or discourage any path forward.  Consequently, the 
Pregnancy Disclosure advances a significant government interest, namely 
the state’s interest in the public health of the pregnant population in the 
state.  From a public health perspective, the wide array of health facilities 
and professionals included within the Pregnancy Disclosure, making it fa-
cility-neutral, should alert a large percentage of pregnant people early in 
their pregnancy to important resources.208  This allows the pregnant person 
sufficient notice of their options and the resources available.  The audience-
neutral approach of the Pregnancy Disclosure also gets this vital infor-
mation to all pregnant people, regardless of whether they consider an abor-
tion or not.209  The early months of a pregnancy are crucial when deciding 
to terminate the pregnancy or to carry the fetus to term; abortion procedures 
are simpler, less invasive, and cheaper in the earlier weeks and months210 
and, similarly, prenatal care, such as ensuring the appropriate amount of fo-
lic acid, is vital to the healthy development of a pregnancy that will be con-
tinued.211  The earlier the pregnant people of Maryland receive this infor-
mation, the earlier they can engage with whatever resources they may need 
to help them make a decision and the quicker they can feel more in control 
regarding what lies ahead.212 
Additionally, the Pregnancy Disclosure is drawn to achieve this state 
interest in its pregnant population’s health by reaching the pregnant person 
at the earliest possible point through a facility-neutral and audience-neutral 
net of all health care facilities and pregnancy-related facilities.  Therefore, 
under the intermediate scrutiny test, the Pregnancy Disclosure does not vio-
late the First Amendment. 
                                                 
 208.  In a survey, ninety-seven percent of practicing obstetrician-gynecologists encountered 
patients seeking abortions.  Debra B. Stulberg et al., Abortion Provision Among Practicing Obste-
trician-Gynecologists, 118 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 609, 611 (2011). 
 209.  Currently, abortion-related disclosures do not occur until a pregnant person enters an 
abortion clinic or other facility offering abortions and requests the procedure.  See, e.g., Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (requiring a disclosure when a person 
wants to have an abortion, but not otherwise required for pregnant people at large). 
 210.  First-trimester abortions carry minimal risk and there is almost no risk of future problems 
such as infertility or ectopic pregnancy.  GUTTMACHER INST., FACT SHEET: INDUCED ABORTION 
IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2018), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/factsheet/fb_induced_abortion.pdf.  
 211.  What Is Prenatal Care and Why Is It Important?, EUNICE KENNEDY SHRIVER NATIONAL 
INST. OF CHILD HEALTH AND HUMAN DEV. (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/pregnancy/conditioninfo/prenatal-care.  Additionally, 
prenatal care helps reduce the risk of pregnancy complications and the fetus and infant’s risk of 
complications, as well as ensure the pregnant person’s diet and medication usage is safe for the 
fetus.  Id. 
 212.  “In the healthcare context, mandated disclosures can successfully preserve patient choice 
and broader liberty interests, impart important dignitary values, and restore a semblance of control 
to helpless-feeling patients.”  Erin Bernstein, The Upside of Abortion Disclosure Laws, 24 
STANFORD L. & POL’Y REV. 171, 197 (2013) (footnotes omitted). 
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C.  Constitutional Advantages Make the Pregnancy Disclosure an 
Attractive Option for the Maryland General Assembly 
In addition to being constitutional under the reasonableness test and in-
termediate scrutiny test, the Pregnancy Disclosure has additional constitu-
tional advantages.  While abortion-related disclosures are often fought 
through litigation by various groups,213 in this case groups from both sides 
of the debate can band together to form the Pregnancy Disclosure.  Given 
that it is facility-neutral and audience-neutral, in addition to providing in-
formation about both crisis pregnancy centers and abortion services, it 
should find wide-ranging support.  Additionally, the legislative process ra-
ther than legal challenges and litigation regarding abortion-related disclo-
sures will allow Maryland citizens to share their thoughts and concerns with 
their elected representatives regarding the content of the Pregnancy Disclo-
sure.  Working through the legislative process will signify that the people of 
Maryland, through their representatives, support an inclusive and informa-
tional message to all pregnant people regarding all of their options. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Since the legalization of abortion in 1973 after Roe v. Wade, the per-
missibility of abortion-related disclosures has changed over time.214  Given 
the recent decision in NIFLA v. Becerra,215 Maryland should institute a 
novel approach to protect and inform its pregnant population.  The Mary-
land General Assembly should pass a facility-neutral and audience-neutral 
Pregnancy Disclosure that informs all pregnant people of the available re-
sources and the scientifically valid risks of both abortions and childbirth.  
This comprehensive document will fully inform and empower all pregnant 
people to make their own best choice.  The Pregnancy Disclosure should 
pass constitutional muster under either the Casey reasonableness test,216 if 
the Court should declare it to be the test for abortion-related disclosures, or 
                                                 
 213.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (describing 
that Planned Parenthood initiated a lawsuit against the state regarding the spousal notification re-
quirement); Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (describing that Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania sued for injunctive relief from the act passed by the Pennsylvania legislature); 
Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., & S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (describing 
Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, North Dakota & South Dakota filed a suit against the enact-
ment of the South Dakota bill). 
 214.  See, e.g., Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); Stuart, 774 F.3d 238 (2014); Lakey, 667 F.3d 
570 (2012); Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (2008); Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Thornburgh v. American 
Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Re-
productive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
 215.  In which the Supreme Court struck down an abortion-related disclosure directed at crisis 
pregnancy centers, rather than the “traditional” abortion-related disclosure allowed after Casey 
directed at abortion providers.  Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2378. 
 216.  See supra Section II.B.1. 
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the current Fourth Circuit precedent intermediate scrutiny test.217  Addition-
ally, the Pregnancy Disclosure has both constitutional and public health ad-
vantages beyond just properly informing the pregnant population218—it 
shows that Maryland residents wish for pregnant people to be fully in-
formed about all of their options and resources from the earliest point, and 
it staves off potential litigation regarding the policy reflected in the Preg-
nancy Disclosure.  Ultimately, instituting the proposed Pregnancy Disclo-
sure will better serve all future pregnant people in Maryland, especially 
those with unintended pregnancies, by ensuring that every pregnant person 
knows of the available resources and the potential risks. The Pregnancy 
Disclosure will help avoid stories like those told by Sharon,219 Cherisse,220 
and Sarah,221 and instead allow every individual to make the best choice for 
themselves and their loved ones. 
                                                 
 217.  See supra Section II.B.2. 
 218.  See supra Section II.C. 
 219.  See supra note 4. 
 220.  See supra note 7. 
 221.  See supra note 11. 
